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Just to be sure, does this mean you emailed a list of 50k sets of login info that you thought might work to a NCSoft employee. And then, he e-mailed you back and told you 10k were valid?
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Brett,
The dispute has always been over volume. I believe what you're saying. However, I believe that your hypothesized vector of attack has always been assumed to be present among the more sophisticated. 1)Claiming that your method is causal basically requires believing that the attackers were dumb before (July? October?) but suddenly got smart. By contrast, believing in NCSoft vulnerabilities requires believing that the hackers were smart to begin with but got smarter after reviewing the condition of the site, and altered the vector of attack as a result. 2)The math associated with brute forcing birthday password resets using botnets is just too attractive to a professional hacker. Especially given that we now know that botnets are being used. In short, I accept the contention that what you describe is part of the explanation, but reject ANet's contention that it constitutes the full explanation. Too many educated people aware of good security practices got hacked for me to believe that this was a simple case of BBS hacking and social engineering. The explanation just doesn't fit the data. |
2) While this is a good theory, it is/was easily checked by examining the logs. Multiple computers/IP's trying to reset the passwords (guess the birthdays) on accounts would create a very unique finger print in a log.